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DECISIONS of the United States Supreme Court are frequently
greeted with outbursts from eminent members of the Quo
Vadis school of constitutional law. Judging from past experi-
ence, two recent opinions, seem destined to meet a reception of this kind.
Important in themselves due to popular interest in the fate of the per-
sons involved, they assume even greater prominence in the light of their
bearing on perplexing problems of state and federal relations. With the
Scechter case' a recent memory, with murmurs in the air of a constitu-
tional amendment granting the federal government power to act in na-
tional economic emergencies, 3 a re-examination of principles long viewed
as basic seems imminent. The proper scope of state activity in the ad-
-ministration of criminal justice, though temporarily overshadowed by
more pressing matters arising from the depression, must form an impor-
tant part of such an inquiry. A consideration of the extent to which
supervision of state courts in this field has already been carried thus
becomes timely.
In approaching the question, the fact that considerations much differ-
ent from those involved in a discussion of the commerce or full faith and
credit clauses in relation to state action are material, is, perhaps, too
obvious to be mentioned. Though many crimes have interstate aspects,
the trial of the apprehended criminal is without national significance in
the sense that it reacts on the economic relations of the several states or
makes for diversity of decision in cases where uniformity is desirable.
Perhaps more than in any other field, the manner of dealing with persons
accused of crime is of concern to the state alone. The cases are not
wanting in expressions of this pious sentiment. Thus Mr. Justice Holmes
has said:
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x Norris v. Alabama, 55 Sup. Ct. 579 (1935); Mooney v. Holohan, 55 Sup. Ct. 340 (i935).
2 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
3 See New York Times, June 2, 1935, sec. x, p. i.
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In so delicate a matter as interrupting the regular administration of the criminal
law of the State .... too much discretion cannot be used, and it must be realized
that it can be done only upon definitely and narrowly limited grounds.4
while in numerous other cases the reluctance of the Supreme Court to
act has been indicated s Reluctant though it may have been in general,
however, the court has not hesitated in specific instances to assert its
power of supervision even in the field of criminal law, the Fourteenth
Amendment being the basis upon which interference has been predi-
cated. Though the process has been accompanied by outspoken- criti-
cism,6 it is believed that the cases reveal an increasing willingness on
the part of the court to intervene in the conduct of criminal cases.
The wisdom which has led that body to refrain from adopting a definition
of "due process" il other connections7 has apparently been carried over
into the field under discussion. But a consideration of those things which
as a result of the "process of inclusion and exclusion" have been deter-
mined to constitute or not to constitute due process may serve, however
vaguely, to mark the boundaries between permissible state action and the
reverse.
One may fairly begin with the assumption that due process of law in
the trial of cases' includes as minimum requirements, notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard, and a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal having
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the action. All of
these factors may be lumped together in the general idea of "fair trial."
With these generalizations it is difficult to quarrel, but the attempt to
apply them in specific cases is fraught with danger and, it is believed,
is rendered more perplexing by the decisions with which one must deal.
At the outset it becomes necessary to distinguish between the "privileges
4 Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 426 (1926).
s See Allen v. Georgia, z66 U.S. 138, 140 (897); Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (I905);
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 289 (1891).
6See Dunbar, The Anarchists' Case before the Supreme Court of the United States,
i Harv. L. Rev. 307 (1888); Charles Warren; The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431 (1926); Hannis Taylor, Due Process of Law 573, 576 (x917).
7Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (877).
s A consideration of the method of disposing of the so-called "common law crimes" is the
primary object of this article. The power of the state to create new crimes and the attitude of
the court toward legislation attempting to do so involve problems not conspicuously different
from those connected with other state legislation. For example, the requirements of definite-
ness and certainty in such legislation seem to be virtually the same as in other types of enact-
ments. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); United
States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
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and immunities" which are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
and the "liberties" which are also safeguarded by that portion of the
Constitution. In spite of the decision in the Slaughter House Cases9
which apparently disposed of the contention, the years from that time
until after the close of the century witnessed a determined attempt on
the part of various litigants to cause the court to rule that the privileges
and immunities of citizens .of the United States included those set out in
the first eight amendments to the Constitution and were thus binding on
the States. 0 Those efforts were uniformly unsuccessful, but the battle
shifted to new ground, it being asserted that the amendments in ques-
tion listed "liberties" which were also sacrosanct by virtue of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This method of attack, as will be seen, proved more
effective, but it introduced another complication. Whereas the abridge-
ment of privileges and immunities was absolutely barred by the amend-
ment, the deprivation of liberty was not prohibited unless accompanied
by a denial of due process. As Mr. Warren has pointed out,"" though the
individual interests, protection of which is sought, remain the same, the
crucial inquiry is as to the manner in which they have been curtailed.2
One finds little evidence in reviewing the decisions of an attempt on
the part of the court to dictate any set form of procedure in the disposal
of state criminal cases. The criterion of "fairness" seems to have allowed
almost complete latitude in the determination of such matters as the man-
ner of accusation, 3 so long as the accused has at least an opportunity to
9 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36 (1872).
lo Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (1887) (citing earlier cases); Brown v. New Jersey,
175 U.S. 172, 174 (1899); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 58I, 584 (1goo); Barrington v. Missouri,
205 U.S. 483, 486 (igo6); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93 (I9O8).
zz Supra note 6.
22 The determination of what things constitute "liberties" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment seems so inextricably entangled with the question of due process that
it has not been attempted here as a separate matter. Mr. Warren, in the article referred to
supra in note 6, has dealt with the question as satisfactorily as seems possible. As will appear
later in the discussion, the denial of representation by counsel constituted a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The court also
seems to have reached the conclusion that free speech is a "liberty." Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (X925). See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Hughes, The Su-
preme Court of the United States 166 (1928).
'3 It was decided at a comparatively early date that a state was not precluded by the due
process clause from substituting the information for the indictment in criminal cases. Hurtado
v. California, -io U.S. 516 (1884); Bolla v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83 (1899). Nor is indictment
by a grand jury a privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (19oo). The court has also held that various formal errors in the indictment
or information did not result in a denial of due process. Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483
(19o6); Hodgson v. Vermont, x68 U.S. 262 (1897); Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692 (189o);
In re Robertson, 156 U.S. 183 (1895).
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secure a full statement of the charge against him, 4 arraignment,' s the
number 6 and qualifications of jurors, 7 challenges to jurors,' continu-
ances, 9 changes of venue2 0 and procedure on appeal.2' The general atti-
tude with reference to procedural questions as evidenced by the decisions
seems to support the statement of the court in Rogers v. Peck that:
Due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
the state to adopt a particular form of procedure, so long as it appears that the accused
has had sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself
in the prosecution."
It will be observed, however, that the italicized portion of the quotation
virtually destroys the effect of the rest of the statement. "The Lord
giveth and the Lord taketh away; blessed be the name of the Lord."
The net result of the foregoing decisions seems to be that, though various
procedural devices may not be in themselves objectionable, if their
application results in a lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard by
an impartial tribunal a denial of due process exists.2 Thus it appears
evident that the cases involving procedural questions, though apparently
indicative of a tolerant attitude on the part of the court, actually are
almost valueless in marking the boundaries within which the states may
act in dealing with crime.
Of the various categories into which the cases fall, one of the most sig-
nificant for the purposes of this investigation is that involving jury trial.
The standard to be applied in determining the existence of due process in
this connection may be stated with deceptive dearness. Though a state
,4Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262 (1897).
is Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914), overruling Crain v. United States, z62
U.S. 625 (x896) in so far as the latter decision held that a formal arraignment was necessary
to due process.
16 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 58I (I900).
'7 Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462 (I8go); Kohl v. Lehlback, z6o U.S. 293 (I895). See Jordan
v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912).
x8 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899), upholding a New Jersey statute providing for
a "struck jury" in criminal cases; Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424 (1926), holding in a habeas
corpus proceeding that the petitioner would not be released because he had been tried on two
different indictments at once, the indictments being for closely related crimes.
'9 Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. i6i (i9io), holding a refusal to grant a continuance
proper in the circumstances.
go Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483 (i9o6).
21 Lott v. Pitman, 243 U.S. 588 (1917); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894); Allen v.
Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
-199 U.S. 425, 435 (I9O5). Italics are the writer's.
'3 Cf. Patterson v. Alabama, 55 Sup. Ct. 575 (1935); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226
(1904).
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may, apparently, deny an accused person a jury trial entirely,24 if one is
granted, the selection of the jury must be conducted in a manner cal-
culated to secure an impartial body from which no class of persons has
been arbitrarily excluded.21 In a long series of cases, rendered dramatic
by deep seated emotional and racial prejudices, the court has had occa-
sion to apply this standard. Though the results retain the appearance of
consistency, it is believed that a marked change in attitude has taken place
in the years since the problem was first presented. It was, of course, es-
tablished at an early date that a state statute or constitutional pro-
vision excluding negroes from service either on the grand or petit jury
because of their color, is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 and
that phase of the question requires no further comment. The real diffi-
culty, and one which still exists, has arisen in connection with cases in
which it has been alleged that such exclusion has been practiced by
officials acting under an unobjectionable statute. A somewhat detailed
consideration of the cases seems necessary. Virginia v. Rives;2 7 decided
at the same term as the Strunder caseS involved the validity of the action
of a federal court in directing the removal of a criminal case from a state
court on the ground of an alleged discrimination against negroes in the
selection of juries. It was properly decided that a case for removal was
not presented,29 but certain language used by the court with reference to
the showing of discrimination bears on the decisions in subsequent cases.
Although the petition for removal alleged that negroes had never been
allowed to serve on juries in the county in question,30 it was stated by
Mr. Justice Strong that in the absence of a showing that the exclusion
was because of their race or color, there was no indication that a federal
right had been denied.3X In Neal v. Delaware,32 the negro prisoner moved
to quash the indictment because of discrimination in the selection of
grand jurors and filed in support of his motion an affidavit setting forth
the alleged systematic exclusion and containing the further allegation
24 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (i9oo).
2s Strauder v. West Virginia, o0 U.S. 303 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 1o3 U.S. 370 (18o).
26 Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303 (1879); Bush v. Kentucky, 1o7 U.S. iio (1882).
A discriminatory statute enacted prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment appar-
ently does not operate as a denial of due process, it being presumed that it will not govern the
selection of the jury. Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882). See Neal v. Delaware, 1o3
U.S. 370 (x88o). If the statute is not in terms discriminatory, but merely creates the possibility
of discrimination in its application it apparently is not objectionable. Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U.S. 213 (1898). See Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (191o).
27 lOO U.S. 3r3 (1879). 2 9 See infra, page 255. s' OO U.S. 313, 322.
28 1O0 U.S. 303 (1879). 30 100 U.S. 313, 315. 32 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
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that the exclusion was because of race and color. The state apparently
entered no denial of the facts set out and it was held to have consented
to the use of the affidavit as evidence. Here, the overruling of the motion
to quash was held to constitute a denial of a federal right. Thus it was
definitely established that on a proper showing of exclusion because of
race and color, the Supreme Court would intervene to prevent a denial
of due process in the courts of the state.33
The decision, however, was of cold comfort to the accused persons who
attempted to raise the point in several subsequent cases. In Bush v.
Kentucky, 34 a motion to set aside the petit jury panel alleged that colored
persons were excluded in the selection of the jury, but omitted the magic
phrase "because of their race and color." In an opinion by Mr. Justice
Harlan, the allegations of the motion were said to be too vague, inasmuch
as the defendant was not entitled to a colored or a mixed jury but could
only demand a jury from which his race was not excluded because of its
color. 3s It would appear from the opinion that the denial of due process is
to be determined, not from the systematic exclusion of colored persons
for whatever reason, but by the subjective intent of the officer charged
with the selection of the jury. This seems to have quieted efforts to secure
reversals for some years. In 1896 two cases from Mississippi were de-
cided. It seems clear that the point now under discussion was not properly
raised in Gibson v. Mississippi,36 but in Smith v. Mississippi37 a motion
to quash the indictment was filed. The motion was verified on informa-
tion and belief and stated that the local officials wilfully and intentionally
excluded negroes from the grand jury on account of their color. It was
held that the motion was properly overruled since it was unsupported
by competent evidence. Neal v. Delaware3s was distinguished on the
basis that in the latter case the state had consented to the use of the
affidavit, while in the principal case such consent was not given. It does
not appear from the report that the state denied the facts set out in the
motion.
Carter v. Texas 39 was a case in which the bill of exceptions showed that
33 As to the point in the proceedings at which interference is permissible, see infra, page 255.
34 107 U.S. 1o (1882).
3s "The allegation that colored citizens were excluded, and that only white citizens were
selected, was too vague and indefinite to constitute the basis of an inquiry by the court
whether the sheriff had not disobeyed its order by selecting and summoning petit jurors with
an intent to discriminate against the race of the accused. This motion was, therefore, properly
overruled." 107 U.S. 110, 117.
36 162 U.S. 565 (1896). 38 Supra note 32.
37 162 U.S. 592 (Y896). 39 177 U.S. 442 (r9oo).
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the negro defendant had not only filed a motion to quash, alleging dis-
crimination in proper fashion, but also had requested permission to in-
troduce evidence showing the truth of the allegations. It was held that
the action of the court in overruling the motion without allowing the
introduction of testimony constituted a deprivation of due process. In
Tarrance v. Florida,40 an affidavit similar to that in Smith v. Mississippi4'
was filed in support of a motion to quash the indictment, and motions
were also filed to quash the venire and panels of the grand and petit
juries for the same reasons as alleged in the motion to quash the indict-
ment. The state moved to strike the motion to quash the venire and
panels, which was sustained. The motion to quash the indictment was
overruled. As to the latter motion, the court followed the decision in
the Smith case, holding that the affidavit did not constitute independent
proof of the facts alleged. The defendant contended that the motion by
the state to strike the other motions was equivalent to a demurrer and
admitted the truth of the allegations, so that further proof was unneces-
sary. The court refused to allow this contention, distinguishing Neal v.
Delaware42 on the ground that the agreement made by the state in that
case was regarded as an admission of the truth of the facts stated, while
in the principal case the motion to strike did not constitute an admission
but was made for the reason that the question should have been presented
by a plea in abatement rather than a motion to quash. Brownfield v.
South Carolina43 was disposed of on the ground that the record did not
show any offer to prove exclusion of negroes from the grand jury, though
this was alleged in a motion to quash the indictment. Rogers v. Alabama"
presented a situation in which a motion to quash the indictment was filed
and an offer of proof was made, but in response to a motion by the state
was stricken from the files because of prolixity. This was held to consti-
tute error. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, denied the
power of the state court to withdraw the question from its consideration
on such a pretext.
The course of decision up to this time cannot fairly be said to reveal a
burning desire on the part of the court to supervise the conduct of state
criminal cases. Indeed, it might be asserted on the contrary that in view
of the basic constitutional question involved, the arguments resorted to in
an effort to sustain the state tribunals verge on unnecessary technicality.
In all of the cases cited, the question was substantially the same, yet in
only three, all of which represented extreme situations, were reversals
40 I88 U.S. 519 (1903). 42 Supra note 32. 44 192 U.S. 226 (i9o4).
41 Supra note 37. 43 i89 U.S. 426 (i9o3).
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granted. Be that as it may, the following seems to be the net result of
the cases: In order to constitute a deprivation of due process, the dis-
crimination must exist and be practiced because of race and color. Ap-
parently it must be alleged and proved that the officials charged with the
selection of the jury were motivated by a desire to exclude for that reason.
Given the proper allegations, a denial of due process exists where there is
an admission or uncontradicted evidence of discrimination, or where the
defendant, having properly raised the issue, has been denied a hearing
thereon.
It will be noted that the case in which a hearing on the question has
been held and it has been decided adversely to the defendant is not cov-
ered by the cases hitherto discussed. The matter is squarely raised by
Norris v. Alabama,45 in which the court entered into a detailed examina-
tion of the evidence and concluded as a result of that examination that
there was a systematic exclusion of negroes and hence a denial of due
process. Thus it appears that where the existence of discrimination is
controverted, due process demands not only that there be a hearing on the
question but also that it be correctly decided. The implications of this
statement will be considered in more detail at another point. In addition
to this holding, which of course represents an extension of, if not a de-
parture from, the doctrine developed in the earlier cases, the court re-
vealed a less rigid attitude as to the requirement that the intent of the
officials must be specifically shown, by asserting:
We think that the evidence that for a generation or longer no negro had been called
for service on any jury in Jackson county, that there were negroes qualified for jury
service, that according to the practice of the jury commission their names would nor-
mally appear on the preliminary list of male citizens of the requisite age but that no
names of negroes were placed on the jury roll, and the testimony with respect to the
lack of appropriate consideration of the qualifications of negroes, established the dis-
crimination which the Constitution forbids.46
Thus it appears that the highly artificial requirement which was stated
by the court in Bush v. Kentucky, 47 if it was ever intended to be applied
literally, has been removed by this case.
Not only has the court been concerned with denials of due process prior
to the commencement of the trial, but also it has had occasion to consider
various matters arising during the course of the trial, as to which the
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment has been claimed. Of these
cases the two which seem to have aroused the greatest interest are Frank
v. Mangum 48 and Moore v. Dempsey.49 The literature produced has been
4' 55 Sup. Ct. 579 (1935). 47 107 U.S. rio (1882). 49 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
4655 Sup. Ct. 579, 582, 583. 4' 237 U.S. 309 (I915).
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extensive," and for that reason detailed comment seems unnecessary.
Both cases involved the question of mob domination of the trial as a
denial of due process, and in both it was recognized that due process is
denied when a trial is in fact dominated by a mob. The chief significance
of the cases lies in their bearing on the method to be used in raising the
question and the effect of the determination of the state court on the
point. A discussion of this problem will be found elsewhere in this paper.-'
Similarly, the decision in Powell v. Alabama,5 2 may be mentioned here
simply as indicating that due process requires that the accused shall have
the aid of counsel in preparing and presenting his defence, while Tumey v.
Ohio 3 shows' that a trial by a judge having a direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the case violates the Fourteenth Amendment. These
cases, it is believed, are clearly instances in which that fair and impartial
trial contemplated by the requirement of due process is lacking, and the
only significant questions are as to the time and method of interference
by the federal courts.
The decisions involving matters of evidence and presumptions in
state criminal cases, however, present somewhat different considerations.
If one may regard rulings as to the admission of evidence as determina-
tions of state law it would seem that, even though erroneous, they do not
involve a denial of due process.5 4 The erroneous admission of evidence
obviously does not in itself deny a fair hearing to the accused. 5 Due proc-
ess has been held not to include the privilege against self incrimination
s6
nor, apparently, does it require an instruction on the presumption of
innocence.5 7 But if the accused is found guilty of a charge where there is
no evidence to substantiate the verdict, a more difficult problem is pre-
sented. It seems possible to argue that if a proper hearing was accorded
the defendant, the result of the trial, even if erroneous, would not operate
to deny him due process within the purview of the Fourteenth Amend-
s0 Waterman and Overton, Federal Habeas Corpus Statutes and Moore v. Dempsey,
i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 307 (1933); 37 Harv. L. Rev. 247 (1923); 33 Yale L. J. 82 (1923);
73 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 430 (1925); 9 Va. L. Rev. 556 (1923); 7 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1923).
st Infra, page 254.
-- 287 U.S. 45 (I932); noted in 7 So. Cal. L. Rev. 9o (1933); 31 Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1932);
8i Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 337 (1933); ig Va. L. Rev. 293 (i933); 23 Jour. Crim. L. 841 (x932);
i Geo. Wash. L. Rev. ii6 (1933); 32 Col. L. Rev. 1430 (1932).
S3 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Cf. In re Manning, 139 U.S. 504 (i89i).
54 See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); In re Converse, 137 U.S. 624 (18gi).
ss See Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483 (i9o6).
s6 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
57 Howard v. Fleming, 19 U.S. 126 (19o3).
TBE SUPREME COURT
ment. In addition it might be said that a contrary holding would result
in the practical difficulty of requiring the Supreme Court to investigate
the weight of the evidence in state cases. Nevertheless, there seems to be
ground for the belief that the supervision of the court might extend to this
situation. In Fiske v. Kansas,s8 a criminal syndicalism statute of a type
held constitutional in other cases s9 was, as applied, held to be violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment, there being no evidence to show that the
organization of which the defendant was a member advocated violent
means of effecting industrial or political changes.0 Not only does this
appear to be true, but it also seems, in the light of the per curiam opinion
in Mooney v. Holohan6x that a conviction based on perjured testimony may
be held violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least when the testi-
mony was knowingly used by the prosecuting attorney.
Brief mention should be made of the power of the state to create pre-
sumptions operative in the trial of criminal cases. The recent case of
Morrison v. Californid2 invalidating a portion of the California Alien
Land Law indicates that here, as well as elsewhere, the court has evinced
a disposition to impose restrictions on state action by invoking the due
process clause. The generalization is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo:
The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make
it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or
explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities
for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser with-
out submitting the accused to hardship or oppression.6 3
This matter, involving as it does a specialized subject, has been dealt
with by far more competent hands than those of the present writerk and
is mentioned here simply for the purpose of indicating another field into
which supervision by the Supreme Court has penetrated.
s8 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
s9 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927).
6o "The result is that the Syndicalism Act has been applied in this case to sustain the con-
viction of the defendant, without any charge or evidence that the organization in which he
secured members advocated any crime, violence, or other unlawful acts or methods as a
means of effecting industrial or political changes or revolution. Thus applied the Act is an
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing
the liberty of the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 274 U.S. 380, 387.
' 55 Sup. Ct. 340 (i935); noted in 25 Jour. of Crim. Law 943 (i935); 35 Col. L. Rev. 404(1935).
62 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Gj 291 U.S. 82, 88, 89.
64 Morgan, Federal Constitutional Limitations upon Presumptions Created by State Legis-
lation, Harvard Legal Essays 321 (1934).
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It seems evident that within the framework erected by the foregoing
decisions may be included any act on the part of the state, whether done
by the legislature, by administrative officials or by the court, the effect
of which is to deprive the accused of what the Supreme Court of the
United States may regard as a fair trial. If, for example, exclusion from
juries may not be practised on the ground of race, it seems equally true
that religious discrimination is objectionable.s If a state may not by
statute deprive an accused person of the opportunity to be heard on a
material issue, what is to be said of the arbitrary exclusion of his testi-
mony by the trial judge? May not other matters, such as misconduct of
the prosecuting attorney, evident bias of the judge, obvious partiality
of a jury lawfully selected, or even complete incompetence of the de-
fense attorney, if appointed by the court, be regarded in the light of a
sufficiently strong showing as a denial of due process? That a fair trial
in fact, rather than an opportunity for a fair trial under procedural
forms, is now the test of due process, seems clearly indicated by the
recent decisions. Thus.it appears that in answer to the query made some
years ago by an eminent authority, "Are there at present any enforceable
restraints upon the powers of a state to regulate its procedure in criminal
cases?"66 One must assert that the power of the Supreme Court to in-
vestigate, and, if need be, to restrain state action is, in the light of the
concept of due process developed by the course of decision previously
traced, virtually unlimited. This conclusion is not surprising in view of
the constantly expanding scope which the due process clause has been
given by decisions in other fields.67 One is not, however, disposed to
apologize for what may seem an elaboration of the obvious, in view of the
fact that little attention has hitherto been paid to the specific problem
at hand.
Though the possibilities of federal supervision may be extensive, this
is not to say that the Supreme Court is likely to interfere with the ad-
ministration of justice by the states as a general rule. Certain voluntary
restraints seem to have been imposed by the court in dealing with the
matter. In the earlier cases one finds an extreme reluctance to interfere
with the orderly course of state procedure. The first method in which it
was sought to secure federal action seems to have been the attempt to
remove cases from the state to the federal court on the ground that a
6d See Searle v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 2o3 Mass. 493, 89 N.E. 809 (igog).
Cf. Swancara, Judicial Disregard of the "Equal Protection" Clause as it Affects the Non-
Religious, 68 U.S.L. Rev. 309 (1934).
61 Hannis Taylor, Due Process of Law 573 (1917).
67See Hough, Due Process of Law-Today, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 218 (i919).
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federal right was being denied in the judicial tribunals of the state. In
Strauder v. West Virginia 8 removal was held proper on the basis that race
discrimination in the selection of a jury was required by statute. How-
ever an allegation of systematic discrimination by officials acting under
an objectionable statute was held not to state grounds for removal in
Virginia v. Rives6 9 and it was ultimately established that the right to
removal exists only when the denial of the federal right is shown by the
constitution or statutes of the state and is not available for a denial of
due process arising after the commencement of the trial.70 So far as can
be discovered, this device is no longer of any practical importance in re-
lation to the problem at hand. The later cases involve the writ of habeas
corpus as a means of securing federal intervention. Once again, generali-
zation is both easy and deceptive. The reports abound in statements to
the effect that habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute for a writ of
error,7' and that it should be brought into play only when the remedies
afforded by state procedure have been exhausted.7 2 It seems clear, how-
ever, that any limitation on the power of the federal courts to issue the
writ when a federal right is involved is imposed because of considerations
of policy rather than by the compulsion of law. Thus, in Cook v. Hart73
it is said that "comity" demands that the state courts should be appealed
to in the first instance, while in Ex parte Roya174 one finds the assertion
that though jurisdiction to issue the writ exists, it will not be exercised
in the absence of special circumstances until the state court has had an
opportunity of determining the question. The "special circumstances"
which the court had in mind were apparently limited to cases "involving
the authority and operations of the general government, or the obliga-
tions of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations." s In the
main it seems evident that the limitations thus imposed have been ad-
68 Ioo U.S. 303 (1879). 69 1oo U.S. 313 (1879).
70 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (i88o); Gibson v. Mississippi, 62 U.S. 565 (1895);
Smith v. Mississippi, x62 U.S. 592 (1895).
71 See Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912) (time for filing affidavit of prejudice of judge);
Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652 (1913) (legality of sentence); Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502
(1915) (refusal to admit evidence); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123 (19o6) (alleged deprivation
of due process because of inability of petitioner to hear testimony); Valentina v. Mercer, 2oi
U.S. i3i (19o6) (instructions).
72 Ex parte Royall, ii 7 U.S. 241 (i886); Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (i886); In re Wood,
140 U.S. 278 (189i); In re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291 (i8gi); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183
(1892); In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70 (1893); New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (894); Pepke v.
Cronin, ISS U.S. 100 (1894); Whitten v. Tomlinson, i6o U.S. 231 (i895); Urquhart v. Brown,
205 U.S. 179 (1907); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184 (899); Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S.
652 (1913); United States v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925).
73 146 U.S. 183 (1892). 74 117 U.S. 241 (885). 7s 117 U.S. 241, 252.
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hered to in practice. 6 Two relatively early cases appear to be anomalies.
In the case of Medley, Petitioner77 an original application for a writ was
brought to the Supreme Court, the petitioner alleging illegal detention
because of his conviction and sentence under an ex post facto law. It does
not appear that the case had been carried through the state courts on this
point. The majority of the court was of the opinion that the law was ex
postfacto and that the prisoner was entitled to his discharge. But being
unwilling to free the prisoner entirely, the court directed the warden of
the state prison to notify the attorney general of the time at which he
would be released, apparently in order that he might be rearrested and
held for further proceedings. Again, in the case of Minnesota v. Barber78
the Supreme Court affirmed an order of the circuit court discharging the
petitioner, who had been convicted and sentenced by a justice of the
peace for the violation of a statute which was held to be unconstitutional.
There is no indication here that the appellate court of the state had been
given an opportunity to rule on the validity of the statute, and in neither
of the cases is the line of decisions exemplified by Ex parte Royall7 9 re-
ferred to. The most recent decisions seem to indicate that the court is
still disposed to hold its hand until after the state courts have been given
every possible opportunity to rule on the question. °
The potentialities of federal supervision being, as indicated, almost
boundless, it is believed that by far the most significant problem arising
from the cases is not the limitations of due process, if such there are, but
rather the question as to how much weight is to be given the determina-
tion of the state courts as to the existence of due process. If the Supreme
Court is content to adopt the conclusions of the state tribunals it is ap-
parent that little control will in fact be exercised over local administration
of justice. It is believed that the early cases previously referred to con-
tain little evidence of an attempt on the part of the federal courts to
enter into an independent investigation of the facts alleged to show a
71 See lu re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (I890) (involving perjury in contested election to seat in
United States Congress); In re Neagle, X35 U.S. i (i8go) (homicide committed in protecting
federal judge from attack); Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205 (1907) (railway clerk acting in
obedience to federal court injunction arrested for violation of state rate statute). For cases in
which habeas corpus was held to be improper, see note 72, supra.
77 134 U.S. I6o (I889). 78 136 U.S. 313 (i890). 79 117 U.S. 241 (1885).
8o Mooney v. Holohan, 55 Sup. Ct. 340 (r935). Certiorari has been denied in the following
cases in which the lower federal courts have considered intervention by means of habeas corpus
untimely: Hale v. Crawford, 65 F. (2d) 739 (C.C.A. Ist 1933); Bard v. Chilton, 2o F. (2d)
9o6 (C.C.A. 6th 1927); Dunn v. Lyons, 23 F. (2d) 14 (C.C.A. 5 th 1927). Strangely enough,
Hale v. Crawford has received unfavorable critical comment. 43 Yale L. J. 444 (1934); 33
Col. L. Rev. 1259 (1933). In addition to the above cases see Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d)
586 (C.C.A. 5th 193i); noted in 32 Col. L. Rev. 740 (1932).
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denial of due process. Thus, the discrimination cases, as has been pointed
out,8' were decided for the most part on the basis of procedural questions
and went no farther than to require a hearing where the existence of
discrimination was denied by the state and proof to the contrary was
offered. In Spies v. Illinois82 the Supreme Court, although upholding
state action did apparently examine the facts and for so doing was criti-
cized for adopting a course tending to deprive the state of its necessary
independence in the administration of local affairs.83 As late as 1915,
however, the majority of the court in Frank v. Manguml4 was of the
opinion that the determination of the state court on the question of mob
domination was entitled to great, if not conclusive, weight.8
One perceives a markedly different attitude in the cases beginning
with Moore v. Dempsey. 6 In that case, Mr. Justice Holmes, who had
dissented in Frank v. Mangum,87 spoke for the majority of the court.
It was there decided that when facts alleged would, if true, make the trial
void, it was the duty of the federal judge appealed to for a writ of habeas
corpus, to examine the facts for himself. An entirely independent in-
vestigation and determination seems contemplated by the opinion. In
Fiske v. Kansas" the court, in dealing with the application of a criminal
syndicalism statute to the acts of the accused, adopted the rule previ-
ously applied in civil cases 9 that:
.... this court will review the finding of facts by a state court where a federal
right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the record to be without evi-
dence to support it; or where a conclusion of law as to a federal right and a finding of
fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the federal
question, to analyze the factsY'
Powell v. Alabama9' presents a case in which the Supreme Court deter-
mined from an examination of the record that there had been a sub-
stantial denial of the right to counsel, in the face of a contrary conclu-
sion by the state court, and in Norris v. Alabama,92 Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes stated what seems to be the present position of the court in these
words:
That the question of denial of due process is one of fact does not relieve us of the
duty to determine whether in truth a federal right has been denied. When a federal
" Supra page 250. 4 237 U.S. 309 (i915). 87Supra note 84.
82 123 U.S. 131 (1887). 8S 237 U.S. 309, 329. 88 274 U.S. 380 (1927)
83 Dunbar, supra note 6. 86 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
89 Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 26r (1912); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North
Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 593 (191s); Ward v. Board of Com'rs. of Love Cty., 253 U.S. i7, 22
(1920); Davis, Director General v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923). For a later case see
Ancient Egyptian Order v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737, 745 (1929).
90 274 U.S. 380, 385. 91 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 92 55 Sup. Ct. 579 (i935).
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right has been specially set up and claimed in a state court, it is our province to
inquire not merely whether it was denied in express terms but also whether it was
denied in substance and effect. If this requires an examination of evidence, that
examination must be made. Otherwise, review by this court would fail of its purpose
in safeguarding constitutional rights.9
The conclusion seems inevitable, then, that whether the question arises
on certiorari, appeal or habeas corpus, when a denial of a federal right, i.e.,
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, is properly alleged, it
becomes incumbent on the court to enter if need be into an independent
examination of the facts, which will not be influenced by the conclusion
reached on the same facts by the state court. Granting that due process
requires a correct decision as well as a hearing, the result appears neces-
sary if the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment are to be
effectively safeguarded. It furnishes additional evidence, however, that
the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the court appears com-
pletely to dispose of state supremacy in the administration of criminal
justice.
That this situation is a scandal to numerous observers is clear; that
these cases, if the above analysis has been correct, greatly exceed the
limits which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to embrace is,
perhaps, equally apparent. Whether one points with pride or views with
alarm is dependent on one's views of broader principles underlying state
and federal relationships than this paper was intended to include. It may
be said, however, that criticism of the policy of extended federal control
has at least three aspects. Of these, the one most frequently advanced
and most often embodied in the early opinions, is the alleged disturbance
of the traditional balance between state and nation, and the resulting
subjugation of the former to a dictatorial and unsympathetic control by
a remote central agency. This plaint is constant and raised in many
tongues. As previously indicated it has at least this justification: there
seems to be no controlling reason such as is found in the interstate com-
merce cases or in some of those arising under the full faith and credit
clause, 94 why criminal procedure should be uniform in the several states.
It is believed that in the absence of a definite constitutional sanction
nothing but the most pressing necessity, which will usually be found to be
economic, should cause the imposition of uniform rules upon unwilling
local governments. Though crime, like the tariff, may not be "a local
issue," the method of dealing with crime almost certainly is. Thus, if it
93 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 580.
94 Cf. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (i95); Bradford
Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). See Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Re-
view State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (1926).
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can be said that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
resulted in the establishment of federal control in the administration of
criminal justice they are, in the opinion of the writer, to be deplored.
However, it is submitted that they indicate the possibility of such control
rather than the actuality. The process of counting noses is perhaps pe-
culiary worthless in this connection. But it will do no harm to observe
that of the cases cited in the preceding pages, which are believed to be
substantially all those on the subject in which the court has rendered
opinions since the Civil War, only some ten have been determined to
involve a denial of due process. The effect of this statement is largely
destroyed, however, by the fact that four of them have been decided since
1915, which may be said to indicate a tendency toward more frequent
intervention. What is more important is the relatively restricted scope of
intervention as revealed by a classification of the opinions. Race dis-
crimination in the selection of juries has been the concern of the bulk of
the cases.95 Aside from this, such rudimentary requirements of due proc-
ess as the lack of pecuniary interest of a magistrate,96 freedom from mob
domination,97 the right to representation by counsel,95 the existence of
some evidence to connect the accused person with the violation of a
statute,9 9 and, possibly, the requirement that one shall not be convicted
on the basis of perjured testimony consciously used by the prosecuting
attorney'00 have been insisted on. The Morrison case'0 ' may perhaps
fairly be said to constitute an unjustified interference with the state.
Aside from this, however, it is difficult to quarrel with the results which
have been reached. The recent cases may reveal an increasing concern
for the individual life as opposed to an insistence on the mechanical
application of rules. Granting that the states should be unhampered in
their usual methods of dealing with criminals it seems not too much to
ask that elementary decencies should be observed. To this extent,
supervision by a higher authority seems justified and it is submitted that
for the most part this is all that has been required. To argue that the
way is thus left open to complete federal control is to create false fears.
The confidence which must necessarily be reposed in the "judicial states-
manship" of the court seems sufficient answer to forebodings, while, to
borrow from Mr. Justice Cardozo,' 0 2 the restraining power of that body
95 See cases cited supra pages 248 ff. 97 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
96 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 5Io (1927). 98 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
99 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
zoo Mooney v. Holohan, 55 Sup. Ct. 340 (I935).
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (z934).
Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process 94 (1921). The reference has to do with the
restraint of legislative activity, but the principle appears the same.
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will tend to stabilize the action of state tribunals and cause, perhaps, a
closer adherence to the standard of fair play than might otherwise be the
case.
The other objections raise practical difficulties. Delay in the disposi-
tion of cases if scrutiny by the Supreme Court is to be countenanced
seems unavoidable. To those who feel that the hanging of wrongdoers
promptly is more important than a hanging according to Hoyle, this
would appear to constitute a valid objection to the view just expressed.
A conclusion which would preclude a review by the Supreme Court on
that ground alone, however, seems little better than an advocacy of
lynch law and may perhaps be disposed of without comment. A some-
what similar objection, but one which at least has about it an aura of
respectability, is that the court, already heavily overburdened, is likely
to be flooded with requests for action on state cases to an extent which
would seriously impair its efficiency. The present discretionary character
of review °3 seems an insufficient answer to the problem, since the task
of disposing of requests for certiorari is in itself extremely burdensome.
If, inspired by the recent decisions, defense counsel are to force the
Supreme Court to decide whether or not to grant certiorari in a multitude
of criminal cases, the results are likely to prove disastrous. The only
solution, as Professors Frankfurter and Hart have pointed out, 04 seems
to be a more thorough understanding of the proper function of the writ
on the part of the bar, together with a decent restraint in invoking the
jurisdiction of the court in hopeless cases. But here again, it is submitted
that a problem of mechanics, however important, should not result in
the complete denial of review. The nature of the interest to be protected
precludes such action.
If one were to say that the most significant thing revealed by this
study is that the attitude of the court toward testing criminal cases by
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment has changed from one
of doubt to one of determination he would not be far from the mark. A
willingness to ascertain the existence or lack of due process by an inde-
pendent examination of the facts has replaced the hesitant raising of
procedural obstacles to avoid the task. Potentially, the field of super-
vision of state cases has become virtually unlimited. In practice, it is
believed that the power thus asserted has been wisely exercised for the
most part and that the future will reveal little restraint of the states
as long as fundamental requirements of fairness are observed.
103 43 Stat. 937 (1925); 28 U.S.C.A. § 3 44(b) (1928).
'4 Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48
Harv. L. Rev. 238 (1934).
